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Abstract
We study risk-sharing equilibria with general convex costs on the agents’ trading rates. For an
infinite-horizon model with linear state dynamics and exogenous volatilities, the equilibrium re-
turns mean-revert around their frictionless counterparts – the deviation has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
dynamics for quadratic costs whereas it follows a doubly-reflected Brownian motion if costs are
proportional. More general models with arbitrary state dynamics and endogenous volatilities
lead to multidimensional systems of nonlinear, fully-coupled forward-backward SDEs. These
fall outside the scope of known wellposedness results, but can be solved numerically using the
simulation-based deep-learning approach of [28]. In a calibration to time series of returns, bid-
ask spreads, and trading volume, transaction costs substantially affect equilibrium asset prices.
In contrast, the effects of different cost specifications are rather similar, justifying the use of
quadratic costs as a proxy for other less tractable specifications.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between liquidity and asset prices has been studied extensively in the empirical
literature, cf., e.g., [5] and the references therein for an overview. The analysis of theoretical models
consistent with the main stylized facts established in these studies is challenging, however, since
both models with limited liquidity and equilibrium asset pricing models are notoriously intractable
on their own right. These difficulties are of course only compounded for models where equilibrium
asset prices are determined endogenously in the presence of trading frictions.
Accordingly, tractable models often focus on settings where asset prices [47, 38, 49] or trad-
ing volume [46] are deterministic. Models where asset prices and trading volume both fluctu-
ate randomly have recently been analyzed by focusing on quadratic costs on the agents’ trading
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rates [22, 43, 9, 29]. The analysis of these models crucially exploits the linearity of the correspond-
ing first-order conditions, thereby naturally raising the question how delicately the qualitative and
quantitative predictions depend on the specific choice of the trading costs. Typical examples are
linear transaction taxes or empirical estimates of actual trading costs that typically correspond to
a power of the order flow of around 3/2 [37, 4].
The present study addresses this challenge by studying risk-sharing equilibria with general con-
vex costs levied on the agents’ trading rates. This nests quadratic costs as one special case, but also
covers proportional costs as another limiting case. We show that in an infinite-horizon model with
linear state dynamics and exogenous price volatility, the corresponding equilibrium returns can be
characterized explicitly up to the solution of a single nonlinear ODE. The latter determines the
mean-reverting fluctuations of the frictional equilibrium returns around their frictionless counter-
parts. If costs are quadratic, this “liquidity premium” is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process similarly
as in [22, 9, 29]; for proportional costs it turns out to be a doubly-reflected Brownian motion.
To assess the quantitative differences between the respective equilibrium returns, we calibrate
our model to market data. This is challenging, since agents’ preferences and endowments are not
directly observable. However, we show that this difficulty can be overcome as follows. We first
pin down some of the parameters by calibrating the frictionless model to a time series of prices.
Then, we fit the additional parameters of our model with proportional transaction costs to bid-ask
spreads and trading volume data, by exploiting that the average turnover rate in the model can be
computed in closed form. To obtain comparable results for other forms of trading costs, we in turn
match the corresponding trading volumes and stationary variances of the liquidity premium.
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Figure 1: Simulated frictional equilibrium returns with calibrated parameters for quadratic trading
costs (left upper panel), costs proportional to the 3/2-th power of the agents’ trading rates (right
upper panel), and proportional trading costs (lower panel). The corresponding (annual) frictionless
equilibrium return is constant and equal to 7.64% here.
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As shown in Figure 1, realistic trading costs lead to substantial fluctuations around the constant
frictionless expected returns if agents’ trading targets are calibrated to match the large trading
volume observed empirically. In contrast, the differences between the results for proportional,
quadratic, and intermediate costs are rather small if the magnitude of these costs is matched
appropriately.
Trading volume is a nonlinear function of the equilibrium returns in our model, and this trans-
formation magnifies the differences between different cost specifications. Indeed, for quadratic costs,
volume follows the absolute value of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, whereas subquadratic costs
skew volume towards either zero or infinite rates as observed in the limiting case of proportional
costs. As illustrated in Figure 2, the simulated order flow corresponding to the calibrated model
with costs proportional to a power 3/2 (in line with direct empirical estimates as in [37, 4]) rather
than 2 of the order flow therefore comes closer to matching the substantial skewness and heavy
tails observed in real data.
Nevertheless, the broad properties of both models are rather similar. Accordingly, our results
suggest that quadratic costs on the trading volume can indeed serve as a valuable proxy for other,
less tractable, trading cost specifications.
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Figure 2: Trading volume for empirical time series (lower panel) and simulations with calibrated
parameters for quadratic trading costs (left upper panel) and costs proportional to the 3/2-th power
of the agents’ trading rates (right upper panel).
To analyze whether this remains true in more general settings, we extend our baseline model
to more general state dynamics and endogenous volatilities determined by matching an exogenous
terminal dividend. This allows to study how changes in market liquidity feed back into price
fluctuations, e.g., how volatility is affected by the introduction of a financial transaction tax.
Such more general models lead to fully-coupled systems of nonlinear forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equations. To wit, the optimal positions evolve forward from the agents’ initial
3
allocations. In contrast, the initial optimal trading rates need to be determined as part of the
solution, taking into account that trading stops at the terminal time. Likewise, the stock dynamics
also need to be derived from the terminal dividend. For quadratic trading costs, wellposedness of
this multidimensional and fully coupled system has recently been established by [29] for agents with
sufficiently similar risk aversions. If trading costs are not quadratic, wellposedness of the system is
a challenging open problem, and simplifications to systems of coupled Riccati equations as in [29]
are not possible even with linear state dynamics.
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Figure 3: Difference between simulated frictional and frictionless equilibrium prices with calibrated
parameters for quadratic costs (left panel) and 3/2-costs (right panel).
However, we demonstrate that, the system can be solved numerically by adapting the simulation-
based deep learning approach of [28] if the time horizon is not too long. Here, the idea is to use a
deep neural network to parametrize the “decoupling field” that describes the backward components
as a function of the forward variables. For each choice of the decoupling field, the corresponding
forward dynamics of the system can in turn be simulated by a standard Euler scheme, so that it
remains to keep updating the initial guess for the decoupling field using stochastic gradient descent
until the simulation matches the terminal condition of the equation sufficiently well.
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Figure 4: Difference between simulated frictional and frictionless equilibrium volatilities with cali-
brated parameters for quadratic costs (left panel) and 3/2-costs (right panel).
We verify that our algorithm produces accurate results by comparing it to the Riccati sys-
tem that describes the equilibrium in a benchmark example with quadratic costs and linear state
4
dynamics in [29]. With minor adjustments, the same algorithm is also able to deal with other
trading cost specifications. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where we plot the differences between
frictional and frictionless equilibrium prices for quadratic costs and costs equal to the 3/2-th power
of the agents’ trading rates as in [1, 4]. Again, the precise choice of the trading cost only leads
to small effects, even though the equilibrium volatility adjustment is deterministic for quadratic
costs (as shown analytically in [29] and confirmed numerically in the left panel of Figure 4), but a
mean-reverting stochastic process for 3/2-costs, see the right panel of Figure 4.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our frictionless
baseline model and derives the corresponding equilibrium returns. In Section 3 this model and
the equilibrium results are extended to general smooth convex costs on the agents’ trading rates.
The limiting case of proportional transaction costs is treated separately in Section 4. Both models
are calibrated to time series data in Section 5. Equilibrium prices in more general models with
arbitrary state dynamics and endogenous volatilities are linked to nonlinear FBSDEs in Section 6
and solved numerically in Section 7. For better readability, all proofs are collected in Section 8 as
well as Appendices A and B.
Notation Fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) supporting a standard Brownian
motion (Wt)t≥0 and denote by L p the adapted processes (Xt)t≥0 that satisfy E[
∫ T
0 |Xt|pdt] < ∞
for all T > 0.
2 Frictionless Baseline Model
2.1 Risk-Sharing Economy
We consider two agents indexed by n = 1, 2 that receive (cumulative) random endowments
dζnt = β
n
t dWt, where β
n
t = β
nWt, β
n ∈ R.
To hedge against the fluctuations of their endowments, the agents trade a safe and a risky asset.
The price of the safe asset is exogenous and normalized to one. The price of the risky asset follows
dSt = µtdt+ σdWt.
Here, the constant volatility σ is given exogenously, whereas the expected returns process µ ∈ L 2
is to be determined endogenously by matching the agents’ demand to the fixed supply s ∈ R of the
risky asset; see [46, 51, 16, 33, 22, 50, 9] for related equilibrium models where the volatility is a free
parameter. Models where the volatility is determined endogenously are discussed in Section 6.
2.2 Frictionless Optimization and Equilibrium
As a reference point, we first consider the frictionless version of the model. Starting from fixed
initial positions that clear the market, ϕ10−+ϕ20− = s, the agents choose their positions ϕ ∈ L 2 in
the risky asset to maximize one-period expected returns penalized for the corresponding variances.
Without transaction costs, the continuous-time version of this criterion is
J¯nT (ϕ) = E
[∫ T
0
(ϕtdSt + dζ
n
t )−
γn
2
d〈∫ ·0ϕudSu + ζn〉t] = E [∫ T
0
(
ϕtµt − γ
n
2
(σϕt + β
n
t )
2
)
dt
]
.
(2.1)
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Put differently, agents trade off expected returns against the tracking error relative to the exogenous
target position −βn/σ as in [17, 43]. The optimal strategy for (2.1) is readily determined by
pointwise optimization as
ϕnt =
µt
γnσ2
− β
n
t
σ
, t ∈ [0, T ].
The equilibrium return is in turn pinned down by matching the agents’ total demand ϕ1t + ϕ
2
t to
the supply s of the risky asset at all times t ∈ [0, T ]:
µ¯t = γ¯
[
sσ2 + σ(β1t + β
2
t )
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], where γ¯ = γ
1γ2
γ1 + γ2
. (2.2)
The agents’ optimal trading strategies corresponding to this frictionless equilibrium return are
ϕ¯1t =
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
+
γ2β2t − γ1β1t
(γ1 + γ2)σ
ϕ¯2t = s− ϕ¯1t , t ∈ [0, T ].
Note that the frictionless equilibrium return and the corresponding optimal trading strategies
are independent of the time horizon T . In particular, the frictionless optimizers also maximize the
long-run average performance J¯nT /T as T →∞, in that
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
[
J¯nT (ψ)− J¯nT (ϕ)
] ≤ 0, for all competing admissible strategies ψ.
With transaction costs – where the optimizers are no longer independent of the planning horizon
– we will directly solve the long-run version of (2.1), see Definitions 3.2 and 4.1 below.
3 Equilibrium with Costs on the Trading Rate
3.1 Costs and Strategies
We now take into account transaction costs. A popular class of models originating from the optimal
execution literature [2, 1] focuses on absolutely continuous trading strategies,
ϕt = ϕ
n
0− +
∫ t
0
ϕ˙udu, t ≥ 0,
and penalizes the trading rate ϕ˙t = dϕt/dt with an instantaneous trading cost G(ϕ˙t). Portfolio
choice problems for the most tractable specification G(x) = λx2/2, λ > 0 are analyzed in single-
agent models by [22, 3, 42, 26]; equilibrium returns are determined in [22, 43, 9]. In [27, 14, 8],
single-agent models are solved for the more general power costs G(x) = λ|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2] proposed
by [1]. Below, we will determine equilibrium returns for general smooth convex cost functions G
as studied in the duality theory of [25]:
Assumption 3.1. (i) The trading cost G : R→ R+ is convex, symmetric, and strictly increasing
on [0,∞), differentiable on [0,∞), and satisfies G(0) = 0;
(ii) The derivative G′ is also strictly increasing and differentiable on (0,∞) with G′(0) = 0;
(iii) There exist constants C > 0, k ≥ 2 and x0 > 0 such that
|(G′)−1(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|k−1) for all x ∈ R, ((G′)−1)′(x) ≥ 1
C
for all |x| > x0.
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One readily verifies that the power functions G(x) = λ|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2] proposed in [1] satisfy
all of these requirements. So do linear combinations of these power functions, for example.
With transaction costs, the analogue of the frictionless mean-variance goal functional (2.1) is
JnT (ϕ˙) = E
[∫ T
0
(
ϕtµt − γ
n
2
(σϕt + β
n
t )
2 −G(ϕ˙t)
)
dt
]
. (3.1)
Unlike its frictionless counterpart, this optimization problem is no longer “myopic”, since the
current position influences future choices in the presence of transaction costs, and since optimal
strategies naturally depend on a finite time horizon T here. To simplify the analysis below, we
therefore focus on the ergodic limit of (3.1), where the goal is to maximize the long-run average
performance JnT (ϕ˙)/T as T → ∞. This criterion has a long history in single-agent problems with
transaction costs, cf. [19, 45, 18, 23, 26]. Here, we show that it also allows to make the equilibrium
analysis of general trading costs tractable. Throughout, we focus on admissible strategies
ϕt = ϕ
n
0− +
∫ t
0
ϕ˙udu, t ≥ 0
that satisfy the integrability conditions
E
[∫ T
0
G(ϕ˙t)dt
]
<∞, E
[∫ T
0
ϕ2tdt
]
<∞, (3.2)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
1
T 2
E[ϕ2T ] = 0. (3.3)
3.2 Equilibrium
Definition 3.2. µ ∈ L 2 is a (long-run) equilibrium return if there exist admissible trading rates
ϕ˙1, ϕ˙2 for agents 1 and 2 such that:
(Market Clearing) The total demand ϕ1 + ϕ2 matches the supply s of the risky asset at all times;
(Individual Optimality) The trading rate ϕ˙n is optimal for the long-run version of agent n’s control
problem (3.1) in that,
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
[
JnT (ψ˙)− JnT (ϕ˙n)
]
≤ 0, for all competing admissible trading rates ψ˙. (3.4)
The construction of the equilibrium return is based on the solution of a nonlinear ODE. For
single-agent models with instantaneous trading costs of power form, a corresponding equation has
been introduced and studied by [27].1 In Appendix A, we show that their existence and uniqueness
proof can be extended to general cost functions satisfying Assumption 3.1.
1Indeed, if G(x) = λ|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2], set δ2 = γσ2, 2q−1q = δ2q−2λ as well as q = α + 1 in (3.5). Then,
differentiating the first-order ODE (17) in [27, Theorem 6] leads to the second-order ODE (3.5). The same link to a
first-order equation is exploited in our existence proof in Appendix A.
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Lemma 3.3. Suppose the instantaneous trading cost G satisfies Assumption 3.1 and define
γ =
γ1 + γ2
2
, δ =
γ1β1 − γ2β2
(γ1 + γ2)σ
.
Then the ordinary differential equation
1
2
δ2g′′(x) + g′(x)(G′)−1(g(x)) = γσ2x (3.5)
has a unique solution g on R such that xg(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R. Moreover, g satisfies
lim
x→−∞
g(x)
(G∗)−1(γσ
2
2 x
2)
= 1, lim
x→+∞
g(x)
(G∗)−1(γσ
2
2 x
2)
= −1, (3.6)
where G∗ is the Legendre transform of G.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With the function g from Lemma 3.3, we can now define the state variable that will drive both
the expected returns and optimal trading rates in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4. Let g be the solution of the ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3. There exists a unique strong
solution of the SDE
dXt = (G
′)−1[g(Xt)]dt+ δdWt, t ≥ 0, X0 = ϕ10− −
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
. (3.7)
Proof. This follows from results of [48], see Section 8.1.
Remark 3.5. If the instantaneous trading cost is quadratic, G(x) = λx2/2, then (G′)−1[x] = x/λ,
and the solution of (3.5) from Lemma 3.3 is g(x) = −√γλσx. Accordingly, the dynamics (3.7)
simplify to
dXt = −
√
γ
λ
σXtdt+ δdWt, t ≥ 0, X0 = ϕ10− −
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
.
Whence, X is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in this case. In general, the drift rate in (3.7) describes
the nonlinear attraction of the process X towards its average level zero, where xg(x) ≤ 0 ensures
that the process is indeed mean reverting.
We now present our first main result. It identifies the equilibrium return for general smooth,
convex cost functions.
Theorem 3.6. With the solution (Xt)t≥0 of (3.7), define
µt = γ¯
[
sσ2 + σ(β1t + β
2
t )
]
+
(γ1 − γ2)σ2
2
Xt, t ≥ 0. (3.8)
Then, the trading rates
ϕ˙1t = (G
′)−1[g(Xt)], ϕ˙2t = −(G′)−1[g(Xt)], t ≥ 0 (3.9)
clear the corresponding market and are individually optimal in the long run. Therefore, (µt)t≥0 is
an equilibrium return.
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Proof. See Section 8.1.
The first term in (3.8) is the frictionless equilibrium return from (2.2). Accordingly, the second
term describes how the equilibrium return changes due to transaction costs. Evidently, if both
agents have the same risk aversion, then the adjustment is zero like for the quadratic costs studied
by [9]. In this case, both agents are adversely affected by the transaction costs, but the market still
clears at the frictionless equilibrium price.
For heterogenous agents, there is a nontrivial liquidity premium depending on the current
demand imbalance. Indeed, in equilibrium, the state dynamics dXt also describe the evolution of
the deviation between agent 1’s actual position and its frictionless counterpart,
dXt = (G
′)−1[g(Xt)]dt+ δdWt = (G′)−1[g(Xt)]dt+
γ1β1 − γ2β2
(γ1 + γ2)σ
dWt = d(ϕ
1
t − ϕ¯1t ).
By market clearing, the sign is reversed for agent 2. Accordingly, the liquidity premium is positive
if the more risk averse agent wants to sell and negative if the more risk averse agent wants to buy
to move closer to the corresponding frictionless allocation. In each case, the return adjustment
ensures market clearing by offsetting the more risk averse agent’s stronger motive to trade.
For quadratic costs, we recover the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck returns from [9, Corollary 5.5]. For
general convex trading costs, these are replaced by processes with nonlinear mean-reversion speeds.
4 Equilibrium with Proportional Costs
One important cost specification is not covered by Assumption 3.1: proportional transaction costs.
These arise as the limit p → 1 in the model of [1]. Rather than studying the (singular) limiting
behaviour of the corresponding optimal strategies as in [27], we instead show that the equilibrium
with proportional costs can be constructed directly using singular rather than regular stochastic
control.
Since proportional costs only penalize trade size but not speed, risky positions are naturally
described by general finite-variation processes in this case or, equivalently, by their Jordan-Hahn
decompositions into minimal increasing processes – the cumulative numbers of shares purchased
and sold:
ϕt = ϕ
n
0− + ϕ
↑
t − ϕ↓t .
As in [31, 41, 18, 40] we assume for simplicity that the (cumulative) costs λ(ϕ↑T + ϕ
↓
T ), λ > 0, are
proportional to the number of shares traded (rather than the monetary amount transacted). Agent
n’s goal functional in turn becomes
JnT (ϕ) = E
[∫ T
0
(
ϕtµt − γ
n
2
(σϕt + β
n
t )
2
)
dt− λ(ϕ↑T + ϕ↓T )
]
. (4.1)
We again focus on the long-run average performance JnT (ϕ)/T as T → ∞ of admissible strategies
that satisfy the integrability condition
E
[∫ T
0
ϕ2tdt
]
<∞, E[ϕ↑T + ϕ↓T ] <∞, (4.2)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
1
T
E [|ϕT |] = 0. (4.3)
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4.1 Equilibrium
We use an analogous notion of Radner equilibrium as in Definition 3.2:
Definition 4.1. µ ∈ L 2 is a (long-run) equilibrium return if there exist admissible strategies ϕ1,
ϕ2 for agents 1 and 2 such that:
(Market Clearing) The total demand ϕ1 + ϕ2 matches the supply s of the risky asset at all times;
(Individual Optimality) The strategy ϕn is optimal for the long-run version of agent n’s control
problem (4.1) in that,
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
[JnT (ψ)− JnT (ϕ)] ≤ 0, for all competing admissible strategies ψ. (4.4)
The construction of the equilibrium return with proportional costs is based on the analogue
of the mean-reverting process from Lemma 3.4. This turns out to be a doubly-reflected Brownian
motion,
dXt = δdWt + dLt − dUt, (4.5)
where X0− = ϕ10−− sγ
2
γ1+γ2
and L, U are the minimal increasing processes with L0− = U0− = 0 that
keep (Xt)t≥0 in the interval [−l, l],2 whose endpoints have the following explicit expression:
l = 3
√
3λδ2
2γσ2
, (4.6)
where γ and δ are defined as in Lemma 3.3.
With the state variable X at hand, we can now formulate our second main result. It shows
that the equilibrium return with proportional costs can be expressed in direct analogy to its coun-
terpart for the smooth, superlinear costs treated in Theorem 3.6. The only difference is that the
mean-reverting state variable in Theorem 3.6 is replaced by the doubly-reflected Brownian motion
from (4.5).
Theorem 4.2. With the solution (Xt)t≥0 of (4.5), define
µt = γ¯
[
sσ2 + σ(β1t + β
2
t )
]
+
(γ1 − γ2)σ2
2
Xt, t ≥ 0. (4.7)
Then, the trading strategies
ϕ1t = ϕ
1
0− + Lt − Ut, ϕ2t = ϕ20− + Ut − Lt, t ≥ 0, (4.8)
clear the market and are individually optimal in the long run. Therefore (µt)t≥0 is an equilibrium
return.
Proof. See Section 8.2.
Note that, in equilibrium, each agent’s singular control problem has a fully explicit solution.
Similar closed-form expressions for optimal no-trade regions also obtain for the ergodic control of
Brownian motion, which underlies the tractability of problems with small transaction costs [44, 32,
11]. Surprisingly, the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 4.2 displays the same tractability, even
though the corresponding equilibrium return is not zero but a reflected Brownian motion.
2See [36] for the pathwise construction of L, U . In particular, there is an initial jump in L or U if the initial value
X0− lies below −l or above l, respectively. On (0, T ], L and U have continuous paths.
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5 Calibration
To assess the quantitative properties of our equilibrium returns, we now calibrate the model to
price and trading volume data for a typical US stock, American Express (AXP). We use ten years
of data from January 2, 2009 to January 2, 2019 available on the Nasdaq website.3
5.1 Calibration of the Frictionless Baseline Model
We first consider the frictionless baseline version of the model from Section 2.2. The exogenous
(absolute) volatility σ can be estimated directly from the time series of stock prices, leading to
σ = 15.003 for our AXP dataset.4 To obtain a simple parsimonious model for the equilibrium
returns, we suppose throughout as in [38] that there is no aggregate endowment (β1t = −β2t =
σδWt). Then, the frictionless equilibrium expected return from (2.2) is µ¯ = γ¯sσ
2. As the number
of shares outstanding is s = 854262000,5 we choose γ¯ = 3.971× 10−11 to match this to the average
(absolute) yearly returns of 7.635 in the AXP time series.
5.2 Calibration with Transaction Costs
Whereas the frictionless equilibrium price only depends on the aggregate risk aversion γ¯ = γ
1γ2
γ1+γ2
and aggregate endowment β1 + β2, the individual values of these parameters need to be pinned
down to determine equilibria with transaction costs. Moreover, the initial allocations fo the agents
need to be specified and an appropriate estimate for the respective trading cost is evidently needed.
Proportional Costs For proportional costs, we use the AXP bid-ask spread quoted on BATS
on Dec. 21, 2018 as a proxy: λ1 = 1.05.
6 Once the aggregate risk aversion γ¯ is fixed, the individual
agents’ absolute risk aversions γ1, γ2 are free parameters in the present model, which correspond to
the agents’ sizes relative to each other. If both agents are of the same size, the frictional equilibrium
coincides with its frictionless counterpart. To illustrate the effect of heterogeneity, we set γ1 = 2γ2,
so that the larger agent 2 has twice the risk capacity of agent 1. Then, with γ¯ = 3.971× 10−11 we
have γ1 = 1.191× 10−10, γ2 = 5.956× 10−11, and γ = (γ1 + γ2)/2 = 8.934× 10−11. For the initial
allocations, we suppose that ϕ10− = ϕ20− = s/2.
Finally, we calibrate the value of the endowment volatilities β11 = −β21 = δ1σ to time-series
data for trading volume. More specifically, we choose the parameter δ1 to match the average yearly
share turnover in 2009-2018, ShTu = 1794406220 (that is, about 210% of the outstanding shares),7
to the corresponding long-term average value in our model. Using the ergodic theorem, the latter
can be calculated as in [23, Lemma C.2.],
ShTu = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
d|ϕ|t = lim
T→∞
LT
T
+ lim
T→∞
UT
T
=
δ21
2l
=
(
γσ2
12λ1
)1/3
δ
4/3
1 a.s.
Accordingly, we have
δ1 =
(
ShTu312λ1
γσ2
) 1
4
= 1.379× 109, so that β11 = −β21 = δ1σ = 2.069× 1010.
3See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp.
4For the stock prices around 100 in our time series, this corresponds to a Black-Scholes volatility of around 15%.
5See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp/stock-report.
6Since the corresponding stock price was approximately 100, this corresponds to a relative bid-ask spread of around
1%, in line with the parameter values used in [39, 10], for example.
7See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp/historical?tf=10y.
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Superlinear Costs For comparison, we also consider the power costsGq(x) = λq|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2].
In this case, the ergodic theorem shows that the long-term average share turnover per year is
ShTu = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
|ϕ˙1t |dt =
∫ ∞
−∞
∣∣(G′q)−1[gq(x)]∣∣ νq(x)dx a.s.
Here, νq(x) is the invariant density of the stationary law of the state variable X. For quadratic
costs G2(x) = λ2x
2/2, this is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (cf. Remark 3.5) whose stationary dis-
tribution is Gaussian with mean zero and variance δ22/2
√
γσ2/λ2. As (G
′
2)
−1[g(x)] = −√γσ2/λ2x,
the average turnover per year in turn is proportional to δ2 in this case,
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
|ϕ˙1t |dt =
√
γσ2
λ2
√
2
pi
δ2√
2 4
√
γσ2/λ2
=
(
γσ2
pi2λ2
)1/4
δ2 a.s.
Accordingly, we have δ2 = ShTu/(
γσ2
pi2λ2
)1/4, and it remains to choose an appropriate value for the
trading cost parameter λ2. To make its impact comparable to the proportional cost, we choose it to
obtain the same stationary variance of the state variable X as with proportional costs. With pro-
portional costs, this process has a uniform stationary law with standard deviation l/
√
3. With
quadratic costs, the stationary standard deviation of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck state variable is
δ2/
4
√
4γσ2/λ2 = ShTu
√
piλ2/
√
2γσ2. To match this with the stationary standard deviation for
proportional costs, we choose λ2 = 3.725 × 10−10. This leads to δ2 = 1.173 × 109, and hence
β12 = β
2
2 = δ2σ = 1.760 × 1010. Note that his value is substantially smaller than direct estimates
for quadratic costs used in [21, 12], for example. Whence, the value we use here should lead to
conservative lower bound for the corresponding equilibrium effects of actual superlinear trading
costs.
For general power costs Gq(x) = λq|x|q/q the solution gq of the ODE (3.5) is not known
explicitly. However, by exploiting the homotheticity of the power function, a change of variable
allows to reduce (3.5) to an equation that only depends on the elasticity q of the price impact
function, but not the parameters λq, δq that we are trying to determine here. Accordingly, the
values of λq, δq that match the average share turnover observed empirically as well as the variance
of the state variable for proportional costs can be expressed as integrals of this universal function.
For fixed q, these can in turn be computed by using a quadrature formula to integrate the numerical
solution of (3.5), cf. Appendix B for more details.
For q = 1.5 (which is in line with empirical estimates of actual trading costs in [4, 37]), this
leads to
δ1.5 = 1.252× 109, λ1.5 = 1.78× 10−5,
and in turn
β11.5 = −β21.5 = 1.879× 1010.
Simulations of the equilibrium returns (generated with the same Brownian sample path) for these
three sets of parameters are shown in Figure 1. The corresponding model turnover for q = 2 and
q = 3/2 is compared to the historical trading volume data in Figure 2. Clearly, both simulations
broadly agree with the level and mean-reverting dynamics observed in the data. However, the
small differences between the corresponding state variables depicted in Figure 1 are magnified by
the application of the function |(G′q)−1(gq(·))|, cf. Figure 2. Indeed, periods with very high and low
turnover are substantially more common with subquadratic costs, in line with the empirical data.
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6 More General Settings and Nonlinear FBSDEs
We now discuss how the results from the previous sections formally extend to more general settings
with a finite time horizon, more general state dynamics, and endogenous volatilities. Corresponding
verification results would require wellposedness for non-linear, fully-coupled systems of FBSDEs.
For quadratic trading costs and sufficiently similar risk aversions of the two agents, such results are
developed in [29]. Extensions to more general trading costs are an intriguing but challenging direc-
tion for further research. This is beyond our scope here; however, we discuss numerical algorithms
based on the deep-learning approach of [28] in Section 7 below.
6.1 General Market
In this section, we consider more general state dynamics where, for n = 1, 2, the cumulative
endowment is of the form
dζnt = β
n
t dWt, for a general β
n ∈ L 2,
and the price of the risky asset has dynamics
dSt = µtdt+ σtdWt. (6.1)
Now, not just the equilibrium return process µ ∈ L 1 but also the initial price S0 ∈ R and the
volatility process σ ∈ L 2 are to be determined in equilibrium by matching the agents demand to
the supply s ∈ R of the risky asset. To pin down these additional quantities, we assume as in [29]
that the terminal stock price is given by an exogenous FT -measurable random variable:
ST = S. (6.2)
This can be interpreted as a fundamental value or as a terminal dividend.
6.2 Frictionless Optimization and Equilibrium
The frictionless results from Section 2 readily adapt this more general setting. Indeed, also for a
general stochastic volatility process, pointwise maximization of the goal functional (2.1) still yields
the agents’ individually optimal strategies,
ϕnt =
µt
γnσ2t
− β
n
t
σt
, t ∈ [0, T ].
The equilibrium return is then still pinned down by matching the agents’ total demand ϕ1t +ϕ
2
t to
the supply s of the risky asset:
µ¯t = γ¯
[
sσ¯2t + σ¯t(β
1
t + β
2
t )
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], where γ¯ = γ
1γ2
γ1 + γ2
. (6.3)
Now, however, we also need to determine the corresponding initial price of the risky asset and its
volatility. To this end, insert (6.3) into (6.1) and recall the terminal condition (6.2). This leads the
following scalar quadratic BSDE:
dS¯t = γ¯
[
sσ¯2t + σ¯t(β
1
t + β
2
t )
]
dt+ σ¯tdWt, S¯T = S. (6.4)
As is well known, the solution of this equation can be expressed in terms of the Laplace transform
of the terminal condition, leading to explicit solutions in many concrete examples [29, Section 4.1].
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Example 6.1. If
β1 + β2 = 0 and S = bT + aWT ,
then the frictionless equilibrium price S¯ is a Bachelier model with constant expected returns and
volatilities:
S¯t = (b− sγ¯a2)T + sγ¯a2t+ aWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Agents n = 1, 2’s optimal trading strategies in this frictionless equilibrium are
ϕ¯nt =
sγ¯
γn
− β
n
t
a
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (6.5)
6.3 Frictional Optimization and Equilibrium
With transaction costs, both individual optimization and the corresponding equilibria become
significantly more involved, leading to systems of fully-coupled nonlinear FBSDEs. Let us first
consider the agents’ individual optimization problems for a given initial asset price S0 ∈ R, ex-
pected returns process (µt)t∈[0,T ] and volatility process (σt)t∈[0,T ]. By strict convexity of the goal
functional (2.1), optimality is equivalent to the first-order condition that the Gateaux derivative
limρ→0 1ρ(J
n
T (ϕ˙+ ρψ˙)− JnT (ϕ˙)) vanishes for any perturbation ψ, cf. [20]:
0 = Et
[∫ T
0
(
µt
∫ t
0
ψ˙udu− γnσt(σtϕt + βnt )
∫ t
0
ψ˙udu−G′(ϕ˙t)ψ˙t
)
dt
]
.
As in [7], this can be rewritten using Fubini’s theorem as
0 = Et
[∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
(
µu − γnσu(σuϕu + βnu )
)
du−G′(ϕ˙t)
)
ψ˙tdt
]
.
Since this has to hold for any perturbation ψ˙t, the tower property of conditional expectation yields
G′(ϕ˙t) = Et
[∫ T
t
µu − γnσu (σuϕu + βnu ) du
]
= Mt −
∫ t
0
(
µu − γnσu (σuϕu + βnu )
)
du, (6.6)
for a martingale M = M0 +
∫ ·
0 ZtdWt that needs to be determined as part of the solution. Itoˆ’s
formula applied to (G′)−1 in turn shows that agent n’s optimal position ϕn and the corresponding
trading rate ϕ˙n solve the following nonlinear FBSDE:
dϕnt = ϕ˙
n
t dt, ϕ
n
0 = ϕ
n
0−, (6.7)
dϕ˙nt = Z
n
t dWt +
1
G′′(ϕ˙nt )
(
γnσt
(
σtϕ
n
t + β
n
t
)
− µt − 1
2
G′′′(ϕ˙nt )(Z
n
t )
2
)
dt, ϕ˙nT = 0. (6.8)
Note that for the quadratic costs G(x) = λx2/2 considered in [29], the generator of the backward
component does not depend on its volatility and itself. If the volatility is constant, the backward
equation then becomes linear and can in turn be solved by reducing it to some standard Riccati
equations [7, 9]. For stochastic volatilities, these are replaced by a backward stochastic Riccati
equation, compare [35, 6]. With nonlinear costs, no such simplifications are possible. In fact, the
wellposedness of the system is unclear even for short time horizons since no Lipschitz condition is
satisfied for costs of power form G(x) = λ|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2), for example.
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Despite these difficulties, solving for the corresponding equilibrium return is – surprisingly – not
more difficult than for quadratic costs. To see this, plug both agents’ optimality conditions (6.8)
into the market clearing condition ϕ˙1 + ϕ˙2 = 0. This gives
0 = (Z1t + Z
2
t )dWt +
1
G′′(ϕ˙1t )
(
γ1σt
(
σtϕ
1
t + β
1
t
)
− µt − 1
2
G′′′(ϕ˙1t )(Z
1
t )
2
)
dt
+
1
G′′(ϕ˙2t )
(
γ2σt
(
σtϕ
2
t + β
2
t
)
− µt − 1
2
G′′′(ϕ˙2t )(Z
2
t )
2
)
dt.
Whence, Z2 = −Z1. Moreover, in equilibrium we necessarily have ϕ2 = s− ϕ1, ϕ˙2 = −ϕ˙1, so that
µt =
σt
2
[
sσtγ
2 + γ1β1t + γ
2β2t + (γ
1 − γ2)σtϕ1t
]
, (6.9)
since the trading cost G(x) is symmetric. This is exactly the same formula as for quadratic costs
in [29]. Plugging this expression back into agent 1’s optimality condition (6.6) in turn yields a
backward equation that is linear in the optimal position, like for quadratic costs:8
dYt = dG
′(ϕ˙1t ) = Z
1
t dWt +
σt
2
(
(γ1 + γ2)σtϕ
1
t − sγ2σt + γ1β1t − γ2β2t
)
dt, YT = 0, (6.10)
where the terminal condition comes from YT = G
′(0) = 0. All nonlinearities are absorbed into the
corresponding forward component,
dϕ1t = (G
′)−1[Yt]dt, ϕ10 = ϕ
1
0−. (6.11)
If the volatility process σ is not given exogenously, it needs to be determined from the terminal
condition S. By plugging expression (6.9) for the equilibrium return into the price dynamics (6.1),
we obtain the following BSDE, which is coupled to the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11):
dSt =
σt
2
[
sσtγ
2 + γ1β1t + γ
2β2t + (γ
1 − γ2)σtϕ1t
]
dt+ σtdWt, ST = S. (6.12)
This is again the same equation as for quadratic costs [29]. In particular, if both agents’ risk
aversions coincide (γ1 = γ2), it decouples from the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) and leads
to the same equilibrium price as without transaction costs. For heterogenous but sufficiently similar
risk aversions γ1 ≈ γ2 and quadratic costs, it is shown in [29] that a solution of (6.10-6.12) exists
and identifies an equilibrium with transaction costs. However, the proof crucially exploits that with
quadratic costs, the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) for a given volatility process (σt)t∈[0,T ]
can be studied by means of the stochastic Riccati equation from [35]. Establishing such results
for more general trading costs – where such tools are not available – is a challenging direction for
further research.
Here, let us just briefly sketch how the nonlinear FBSDE (6.10-6.12) reduces to a nonlinear
ODE in the context of Section 3, where the endowment volatilities βnt = β
nWt, n = 1, 2 follow
Brownian motions. As in Lemma 3.3, define
γ =
γ1 + γ2
2
, δ =
γ1β1 − γ2β2
(γ1 + γ2)σ
.
8Here, these linear dynamics obtain if this equation is expressed in terms of G′(ϕ˙1) rather than ϕ˙1. In contrast,
we need to work with the dynamics of ϕ˙n to derive the market clearing condition.
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Since the volatility process is exogenous and constant there, we don’t have to deal with the second
backward component (6.12) and, moreover, can work with the state variable
Xt := ϕ
1
t −
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
+
γ1β1t − γ2β2t
(γ1 + γ2)σ
.
With this notation, the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) becomes autonomous,
dXt = (G
′)−1[Yt]dt+ δdWt, X0 = ϕ10− −
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
, (6.13)
dYt = γσ
2Xtdt+ Z
1
t dWt, YT = 0. (6.14)
Now use the standard ansatz that the backward component Yt should be a function g(t,Xt) of time
and the forward component. Itoˆ’s formula and the dynamics of the forward component in turn
yield
dYt = dg(t,Xt) =
(
gt(t,Xt) + gx(t,Xt)(G
′)−1[g(t,Xt)] +
δ2
2
gxx(t,Xt)
)
dt+ δgx(t,Xt)dWt.
Comparing the drift rate to the BSDE (6.10), we therefore obtain the following semilinear PDE:
gt(t, x) + gx(t, x)(G
′)−1[g(t, x)] +
δ2
2
gxx(t, x) = γσ
2x. (6.15)
For a long time horizon, the solution should become stationary (gt(t, x) ≈ 0). This leads to the
nonlinear ODE from Lemma 3.3:
δ2
2
g′′(x) + g′(x)(G′)−1[g(x)] = γσ2x.
For finite time horizons, where the PDE (6.15) cannot be reduced to an ODE, it is natural to
expect that the correct solution still should be identified by the same growth condition in the x-
variable. However, with a finite time horizon, these bounds will be a strict near maturity. Therefore
solving the corresponding equations numerically – which is not straightforward already in the ODE
case – becomes difficult in this case.
As a remedy, in the next section we therefore propose a numerical algorithm in the spirit of
[28]. It solves the FBSDE by simulation and therefore bypasses the need to identify the correct
boundary conditions. The algorithm approximates the dependence of the backward component
on the forward components by a deep neural network. Whence, it is also able to handle higher-
dimensional settings, e.g., with endogenous volatilities, random and time-varying transaction costs,
etc.
7 Numerics
We now present a numerical algorithm to solve the FBSDEs from Section 6. The algorithm is then
tested for the calibrated parameters from Section 5.
7.1 Deep-Learning Algortihm
Overview Solving the forward-backward system is challenging because it is multidimensional
and the forward and backward components are fully coupled. Nevertheless, it is amenable to the
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simulation-based approach of [28], which approximates the solution by a deep neural network. In
[28] the focus lies on BSDEs, but the approach can readily be extended to FBSDEs.
Let us briefly sketch the main idea; further details on the implementation are provided below.
The first step is to pass to a time-discretized version of (6.10-6.12), e.g., using the Euler scheme.
Solving this system amounts to finding at each time step tk the unknown “controls” Ztk , σtk . If the
terminal condition is a function S(WT ) of the underlying Brownian motion only as in Example 6.1,
then it is well known that the solution and in turn Ztk , σtk are functions of the forward variables,
Ztk = F
θZk (Wtk , ϕ
1
tk
) and σtk = F
θσk (Wtk , ϕ
1
tk
).
The algorithm of [28] approximates each of these functions with a function in the class {F θ¯ : θ¯ ∈
Θ} of neural networks, where we write θ = (θY0 , θS0 , θσ0 , . . . , θσn, θZ0 , . . . , θZn ) for the collection of all
the corresponding parameters. The goal now is to choose these parameters in order to match the
terminal conditions YT = 0 and ST = S(WT ) of the system sufficiently well. To this end, one starts
with an initial guess for the network functions and then simulates the system forward in time.
In this way, a simulated Brownian sample path is mapped to a corresponding terminal condition.
This mapping can be viewed as a deep neural network, which is determined by the choice of the
building block networks {F θ¯ : θ¯ ∈ Θ} (i.e., two networks of type (7.5) for each time-step) and the
FBSDE system, which describes how these building block networks are concatenated over time (see
(7.2) below). To iteratively update the network functions until the terminal conditions are matched
sufficiently well, one may then leverage computational technology available for such networks, such
as backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent-type algorithms, see e.g. [24, Chapters 6 and
8]. This can be implemented efficiently, e.g., in Python using Tensorflow.
Algorithm Let us now describe the approximation algorithm in more detail. Fix a discrete time
grid 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = T . For any choice of parameter θ, consider the following discrete-
time forward system obtained by discretizing (6.10-6.12): starting from initial values ϕθ0 = ϕ
1
0−,
Y θ0 = θ
Y
0 , S
θ
0 = θ
S
0 , for k = 0, . . . , n− 1 calculate
Zθtk = F
θZk (Wtk , ϕ
θ
tk
), σθtk = F
θσk (Wtk , ϕ
θ
tk
), (7.1)
and step forward according to the Euler scheme
ϕθtk+1 = ϕ
θ
tk
+ (G′)−1(Y θtk)(tk+1 − tk), (7.2)
Y θtk+1 = Y
θ
tk
+
σθtk
2
[
σθtkϕ
θ
tk
(γ1 + γ2)− σθtksγ2 + γ1β1tk − γ2β2tk
]
(tk+1 − tk) + Zθtk(Wtk+1 −Wtk),
Sθtk+1 = S
θ
tk
+
σθtk
2
[
sσθtkγ
2 + (γ1 − γ2)σθtkϕθtk + γ1β1tk + γ2β2tk
]
(tk+1 − tk) + σθtk(Wtk+1 −Wtk).
For any choice of the approximation parameter θ, this defines a discrete-time stochastic process,
but of course the terminal conditions Y θT = 0 and S
θ
T = S(WT ) will not even be approximately
satisfied for an arbitrary choice of θ. However, if θˆ is a minimizer of
min
θ
L(θ), where L(θ) = E[(Y θT )2] + E[(SθT −S)2], (7.3)
where the number n of time steps is sufficiently large and the function class {F θ¯ : θ¯ ∈ Θ} is
sufficiently rich, then (ϕθˆ, Y θˆ, S θˆ) should be a good approximation for the solution (ϕ1, Y, S) of
(6.10-6.12) at the time-points t0, . . . , tn.
The minimization problem (7.3) can be tackled using the “stochastic gradient descent algo-
rithm”. The main idea is the following: if the objective functional L was known explicitly and
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differentiable, then the classical gradient descent algorithm could be applied. That is, starting
from an initial guess θ(0), one iteratively updates
θ(j+1) = θ(j) − ηj∇Lj(θ(j)), (7.4)
where Lj = L and the learning rate ηj > 0 is fixed (ηj = η for all j) or decreasing to 0. Under
suitable assumptions on L and {ηj}j∈N the parameter θ(j) then converges to a (local) minimum of
L as j →∞. However, since L is not known explicitly, one applies the stochastic gradient descent
algorithm, which is the same procedure as just described, but approximates the expectations in L
by a sample average in each iteration j,
Lj(θ) = 1
Nb
Nb∑
i=1
(Y θT (W
i))2 + (SθT (W
i)−S(W i))2.
Here, Nb ∈ N is called the “batch size” and Y θT (W i), SθT (W i) are calculated by plugging independent
Brownian motions W 1, . . . ,WNb into the Euler scheme (7.1-7.2).
In order to use this to apply the updating rule (7.4), one needs to be able to calculate ∇Lj(θ)
efficiently and this is the point at which the choice of {F θ¯ : θ¯ ∈ Θ} becomes crucial. As is apparent
from (7.1-7.2), the dependence of the solution on the parameter θ is complex, since the state
variables and parametric functions are iteratively added, multiplied and composed. For instance
Zθtk depends not only on θ
Z
k , but also (via ϕ
θ
tk
) on θZ0 , . . . , θ
Z
k−2 and θ
σ
0 , . . . , θ
σ
k−2. This makes the
computational solution of (7.3) by classical numerical techniques highly challenging. Whence, while
in principle any sufficiently rich parametric family of functions could be chosen for {F θ¯ : θ¯ ∈ Θ}
in the scheme described above, it turns out to be particularly useful to choose a class of neural
networks here. Then, Y θT and S
θ
T can be viewed as the outputs of a deep neural network with
random input (Wtk)k=0,...,n. Thanks to the compositional structure of neural networks one can
then use the chain rule to calculate the gradient ∇Lj(θ) in closed form. Furthermore, the resulting
analytical expressions can be evaluated efficiently using the so-called backpropagation algorithm,
see, e.g., [24]. By using subgradients, this also extends to e.g. the “ReLU activation function” used
below. Finally, all of this can be implemented efficiently in the computational graph structure
employed in libraries such as Tensorflow or Torch.
In summary, the learning algorithm iteratively updates the network parameters θ until a desired
approximation accuracy is reached for some θˆ. Note that the accuracy of the approximation can be
verified out of sample (e.g., in the numerical experiments in in Section 7.2) by simulating a large
number Ntest of additional independent sample paths of W and evaluating the empirical loss Lj(θˆ)
(with Nb = Ntest) on this collection of test paths.
Implementation For the numerical experiments in Section 7.2, each F θ¯ is a neural network
with two hidden layers. For the activation function we choose the popular Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU ) ρ, which applies x 7→ max(x, 0) to each component of a vector. Denoting by N1, N2 ∈ N
the number of nodes in the hidden layer, we thus consider functions of the form
F θ¯(x) = A2ρ(A1ρ(A0x+ b0) + b1), x ∈ R2, (7.5)
where A0 ∈ RN1×2, b0 ∈ RN1 , A1 ∈ RN2×N1 , b1 ∈ RN2 , A2 ∈ R1×N2 are called the weights and
biases of the network and we denote by Θ the set of all parameters θ¯ = (A0, b0, A1, b1, A2). To
find a close-to-optimal parameter θˆ in (7.3) we randomly initialize the network parameters and
subsequently use the Adam algorithm [30], which is a variant of stochastic gradient descent which
adaptively adjusts the learning rates for all network parameters. Here, some initial hyperparameter
18
optimization has led us to choose N1 = N2 = 15, set the initial learning rate to 0.0005 and use
a batch size of 128. In order to accelerate the parameter training procedure, we apply batch-
normalization [34] (see also [24, Section 8.7.1]) at different stages: before the input is fed into the
network, before applying the activation function ρ and after the last linear transformation A2. All
computations are performed in Python using Tensorflow.
7.2 Numerical results
The algorithm introduced in Section 7.1 is now applied to solve the forward-backward equations
corresponding to Example 6.1 from Section 6. As a sanity check, we first consider the simplest
version of the model, where the price volatility is exogenous. In this setting, we compare the
numerical solution to the nonlinear ODE that describes the exact solution of the infinite-horizon
version of the model.
Subsequently, we consider the model with endogenous volatility. In order to test the performance
of the learning algorithm in this case, we compare its results to the semi-explicit solution in term
of Riccati equations obtained for quadratic costs in [29].
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Figure 5: Comparison of the long-run optimal trading rate to the neural-network approximation
of its finite horizon counterpart for power costs with q = 1.5 and t = T − tk = 0.2 (left panel) and
t = T − tk = 0.01 (right panel).
Exogenous volatility We first consider the finite-horizon version of the model from Section 3
with power costs Gq(x) = λq|x|q/q, where q = 1.5, ϕ00 = ϕ10 = s/2 and the model parameters are
calibrated as in Section 5. The algorithm described in Section 7.1 for the general FBSDE (6.10-
6.12) can be readily adapted by setting σθtk = σ for all k, only considering the first two equations
in (7.2), and minimizing E[(Y θT )2]. An alternative, slightly more efficient approach is to use instead
the system (6.13), (6.14) and discretize it analogously to (7.2). The algorithm from Section 7.1
in turn yields a parameter θˆ such that (X θˆ, Y θˆ) approximately solves (6.13-6.14). This allows us
to generate approximate samples of (6.13-6.14) by simulating sample paths of W and evaluating
(X θˆ, Y θˆ). On the other hand we know that Ytk = g(tk, Xtk), where g solves (6.15). Thus we generate
Ntest = 10
6 samples of W , evaluate (X θˆ, Y θˆ) on each of them and obtain an approximation gˆ(tk, x)
of g(tk, x) by assigning to each point x which is attained by a sample of X
θˆ
tk
the associated sample
of Y θˆtk . This yields an approximation of the solution to (6.15) on a (random) grid specified by the
state variable. According to (6.11), the corresponding optimal trading rate is in turn obtained by
applying (G′q)−1(gˆ(tk, ·)) to the state variable.
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We now compare this to the long-run optimal trading rate from Theorem 3.6, where g is
given by the solution of the nonlinear ODE from Lemma 3.3. Figure 5 shows the graph of both
functions at t = T − tk = 0.2 and at t = T − tk = 0.01, i.e., the samples of (X θˆtk , (G′q)−1(Y θˆtk)) =
(X θˆtk , (G
′
q)
−1(gˆ(tk, X θˆtk))) and (X
θˆ
tk
, (G′q)−1(g(X θˆtk))). We observe that the long-run optimum is
already very close to the numerical-solution of the finite-horizon problem even for a time horizon
of just less than a quarter of a year. On the one hand, this justifies the use of the long-run model
as a tractable approximation of its finite-horizon counterpart. On the other hand, it demonstrates
that the deep learning algorithm indeed converges to the correct solution in this simplest version
of the model.
Endogenous volatility We now turn to the model with endogenous volatility from Section 6.
We consider Gq(x) = λq|x|q/q both for q = 2 (quadratic costs) and q = 1.5 (power costs). For λq,
γ1, γ2, and β
1 = −β2 we use the same parameter values as for the model with exogenous volatility
(cf. Section 5) and we also again set ϕ00− = ϕ10− = s/2. The additional parameters a and b are
calibrated to the frictionless equilibrium from Section 6.2. To wit, a is estimated from the time
series (resulting in the same value as for σ in Section 5.1) and b is chosen so that S¯0 = (b− sγ¯a2)T
matches the current stock price. We focus on a short time horizon T = 0.2 discretized into n = 100
time steps.
The deep-learning algorithm from Section 7.1 in turn yields an approximate solution of the
forward-backward system (6.10-6.12). To assess the effect of different transaction costs we compare
the equilibrium price and volatility to the respective quantity in the frictionless equilibrium, i.e.
we examine (sample paths of) the price difference S θˆ − S¯ and the volatility difference σθˆ − a over
time. For quadratic costs it has been shown in [29] that optimal trading rates and the equilibrium
price can be described in terms of a system of coupled Riccati ODEs. This provides a benchmark
in the case of quadratic costs. The left panels in Figures 1 and 3 show two sample paths of the
price and volatility differences for quadratic costs calculated by both methods, i.e., by applying
the neural network based algorithm described above and by solving the system of ODEs derived in
[29]. Evidently, the neural network based method provides a very accurate approximation of the
equilibrium quantities.
The analogous plots for power costs with q = 1.5 are shown in the right panels of Figures 3
and 4 (in order to compare these to the corresponding results for quadratic costs, we use the same
Brownian paths in each case). Note that no benchmark is available in this case. At least for
the short time horizons considered here, the equilibrium prices for the two cost specifications turn
out to be very similar. This corroborates the findings from Section 5 and suggests that quadratic
costs can also serve as useful proxies for other less tractable costs specifications in settings with
endogenous volatilities.
8 Proofs
8.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Strong existence and uniqueness follow from a standard localization argu-
ment, cf. [13, Proof of Proposition 1.1]. By Lemma 3.3, we have g(x) ≤ 0 for x > 0 and, in view of
Assumption 3.1(ii) there exists K > 0 such that
|(G′)−1(x)| ≥ c
2
|x| for |x| ≥ |K|.
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As (G′)−1 is odd, it follows that, for x such that |g(x)| ≥ K,
x(G′)−1(g(x)) = −|x|(G′)−1(|g(x)|) ≤ − c
2
|x||g(x)|.
Notice that |g| is increasing on [0,∞) and satisfies lim|x|→∞ |g(x)| = ∞. Whence, there exists
M0 > 0 such that for every r > 0 and |x| ≥ 2r/c|g(M0)|+M0,
x(G′)−1(g(x))
|x| ≤ −
c
2
|g(x)| ≤ − c
2
|g(M0)| ≤ − r|x| .
Thus, [48, Condition (6)] is satisfied and the results follows. For later use also note that, by [48,
Lemma 1], we have the following uniform moment bounds:
sup
T≥0
E
[
|XT |k
]
<∞, for every k ∈ N. (8.1)
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Market clearing evidently holds by definition of the trading rates (3.9).
Observe that the corresponding positions ϕ1 satisfy
µt − γ1σ(σϕ1t + β1t ) = −γσ2Xt. (8.2)
Consider a competing admissible strategy ψ for agent 1. Identity (8.2) and the convexity of G yield
J1T (ψ˙)− J1T (ϕ˙1)
= E
[∫ T
0
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)
µt − γ
1
2
σ
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)
(σψt + σϕ
1
t + 2β
1
t ) +G(ϕ˙
1
t )−G(ψ˙t) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)
µt − γ
1
2
σ
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)(
σψt − σϕ1t + 2(σϕ1t + β1t )
)
+G(ϕ˙1t )−G(ψ˙t) dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
−1
2
γ1σ2
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)2
+
(
µt − γ1σ(σϕ1t + β1t )
)(
ψt − ϕ1t
)
+G′(ϕ˙1t )
(
ϕ˙1t − ψ˙t
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
−1
2
γ1σ2
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)2 − γσ2Xt(ψt − ϕ1t )−G′(ϕ˙1t )(ψ˙t − ϕ˙1t ) dt] . (8.3)
We now analyze the terms on the right-hand side. To ease notation, set
θ˙t = ψ˙t − ϕ˙1t , so that θt =
∫ t
0
(
ψ˙u − ϕ˙1u
)
du = ψt − ϕ1t .
The dynamics (3.7) of X, Itoˆ’s formula, and the ODE (3.5) for g imply
dg(Xt) =
[1
2
δ2g′′(Xt) + g′(Xt)(G′)−1(g(Xt))
]
dt+ δg′(Xt)dWt
= γσ2Xtdt+ δg
′(Xt)dWt. (8.4)
Integration by parts and the dynamics (8.4) in turn yield
d [θtg(Xt)] =
[
θ˙tg(Xt) + γσ
2Xtθt
]
dt+ δθtg
′(Xt)dWt. (8.5)
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Here, the local martingale part is a true martingale. Indeed, by Ho¨lder’s inequality, the integrability
condition (3.2) and the boundedness of g′ established in Lemma A.5,
E
[∫ t
0
|g′(Xu)|2θ2udu
]
≤ K2E
[∫ t
0
θ2udu
]
<∞.
Also taking into account that G′(ϕ˙1t ) = G′(H(g(Xt))) = g(Xt), we can therefore use (8.5) to replace
the second and the third terms on the right-hand side of (8.3), obtaining
J1T (ψ˙)− J1T (ϕ˙1) ≤ −E[g(XT )θT ]− E
[∫ T
0
1
2
γ1σ2θ2t dt
]
.
The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yields∣∣E[g(XT )θT ]∣∣ ≤√E[g(XT )2]E[θ2T ] ≤√E[2g(XT )2]√E[(ψT )2] + E[(ϕ1T )2].
By the polynomial growth of g established in Lemma A.5 and (8.1), we have supT≥0 E[g(XT )2] <∞.
Together with the transversality condition (3.3), it follows that
0 ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
|E[g(XT )θT ]| ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
√
E[2g(XT )2]
√
E[(ψT )2] + E[(ϕ1T )2] = 0.
Therefore, the trading rate ϕ˙1 is indeed long-run optimal for agent 1:
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
[
J1T (ψ˙)− J1T (ϕ˙1)
]
≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
[
−E[g(XT )θT ]− E
[∫ T
0
1
2
γ1σ2θ2t dt
]]
= − lim
T→∞
1
T
E[g(XT )θT ] + lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
−
∫ T
0
1
2
γ1σ2θ2t dt
]
≤ 0.
An analogous argument shows that ϕ˙2 is long-run optimal for agent 2. This completes the proof.
8.2 Proofs for Section 4
The following lemma provides the counterpart of the function g from Lemma 3.3 for proportional
costs. It is given in closed form; its properties listed here are therefore easily verified by direct
calculations:
Lemma 8.1. With the constant l from (4.6), define
g(x) =
γσ2
3δ2
(
x3 − 3l2x)1[|x|≤l] − λsgn(x)1[|x|>l]. (8.6)
This function has the following properties:
(i) g is an odd, decreasing function;
(ii) 12δ
2g′′(x) = γσ2x for x ∈ (−l, l);
(iii) g′ is continuous on R and g′(l) = g′(−l) = 0;
(iv) For every x ∈ [0, l], we have 0 ≥ g(x) ≥ g(l) = −λ.
Lemma 8.2. The strategies from Theorem 4.2 are admissible and clear the market.
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Proof. Let x = |ϕ10−|+ |ϕ20−|+ l + s. First, note that the initial jump satisfies
−l ≤ X0 = L0 − U0 +X0− ≤ l,
and hence
Xt = δWt + Lt − Ut +X0−.
Therefore, we have
E[|LT − UT |] = E[|XT − δWT −X0−|] ≤ δE[|WT |] + E[|XT |] + |X0−| ≤ x+ δ
√
2T
pi
,
so that the transversality condition (4.3) is satisfied.
Notice that
|Lt − Ut|2 ≤ (|Xt|+ |X0−|+ δ|Wt|)2 ≤ (x+ δ|Wt|)2 ≤ 2x2 + 2δ2|Wt|2.
As a consequence,
E
[∫ T
0
(Lt − Ut)2dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
2x2 + 2δ2|Wt|2dt
]
= 2x2T + 2δ2E
[∫ T
0
|Wt|2dt
]
= 2x2T + δ2T 2,
so that ϕ1 satisfies the first integrability condition in (4.2).
Now, apply Itoˆ’s formula to (XT + l)
2/4l, obtaining
1
4l
(XT + l)
2 − 1
4l
(X0 + l)
2
=
∫ T
0
δ
2l
(Xt + l)dWt +
∫ T
0
δ2
4l
dt+
∫ T
0
1
2l
(−l + l)dLt −
∫ T
0
1
2l
(l + l)dUt
=
∫ T
0
δ
2l
(Xt + l)dWt +
δ2
4l
T − UT + U0.
Rearranging, taking expectations, and taking into account that 0 ≤ U0 ≤ |X0| ≤ x leads to
E[UT ] = U0 +
1
4l
(X0 + l)
2 +
δ2
4l
T − E
[∫ T
0
δ
2l
(Xt + l)dWt
]
− E
[
1
4l
(XT + l)
2
]
≤ x+ l + δ
2
4l
T. (8.7)
After applying Itoˆ’s formula to (XT − l)2/4l, a symmetric calculation and 0 ≤ L0 ≤ |X0| ≤ x show
E[LT ] = L0 +
1
4l
(X0 − l)2 + δ
2
4l
T − E
[∫ T
0
δ
2l
(Xt − l)dWt
]
− E
[
1
4l
(XT − l)2
]
≤ x+ l + δ
2
4l
T. (8.8)
Combining (8.7) and (8.8) yields the second integrability condition in (4.2); therefore ϕ1 is indeed
admissible. Market clearing evidently holds by construction; in particular ϕ2 is admissible as well.
For later use also observe that, by definition,
ϕ1t = Xt − δWt +
sγ2
γ1 + γ2
, γ1σ(σϕ1t + β
1
t )− µt = γσ2Xt. (8.9)
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Proof of Theorem 4.2. Consider a competing admissible strategy with Jordan-Hahn decomposition
ψ = ϕ10− + ψ↑ − ψ↓. To ease notation, set
θt = ψt − ϕ1t , so that dθt = dψ↑t − dψ↓t − dLt + dUt, θ0− = 0.
By properties (i) and (iv) of g from Lemma 8.1, we have
1(−l,0)(Xt)g(Xt)dθt ≤ λ1(−l,0)(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t + dUt
]
, (8.10)
1(0,l)(Xt)g(Xt)dθt ≤ λ1(0,l)(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t + dLt
]
. (8.11)
Since L, U only grow on the sets {Xt = −l} and {Xt = l}, respectively, properties (i) and (iv) of
g from Lemma 8.1 and (8.10-8.11) show that∫ T
0−
g(Xt)dθt
= λ
∫ T
0−
1{−l}(Xt)
[
dψ↑t − dψ↓t − dLt
]
− 1{l}(Xt)
[
dψ↑t − dψ↓t + dUt
]
+ 1(−l,l)(Xt)g(Xt)dθt
≤ λ
∫ T
0−
1{−l}(Xt)
[
dψ↑t − dψ↓t − dLt
]
+ 1{l}(Xt)
[
dψ↓t − dψ↑t − dUt
]
+ 1(−l,l)(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t
]
≤ λ
∫ T
0−
1{−l}(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t − dLt
]
+ 1{l}(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t − dUt
]
+ 1(−l,l)(Xt)
[
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t
]
≤ λ
∫ T
0−
(
1{−l}(Xt) + 1(−l,l)(Xt) + 1{l}(Xt)
) [
dψ↑t + dψ
↓
t − dLt − dUt
]
= λ
[
ψ↑T + ψ
↓
T − LT − UT
]
− λ
[
ψ↑0− + ψ
↓
0− − L0− − U0−
]
= λ
[
ψ↑T + ψ
↓
T − LT − UT
]
.
Together with (8.9), it follows that
J1T (ψ)− J1T (ϕ1)
= E
[∫ T
0−
((
ψt − ϕ1t
)
µt − γ
1
2
σ
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)
(σψt + σϕ
1
t + 2β
1
t )
)
dt− λ(ψ↑T + ψ↓T ) + λ(LT + UT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0−
((
ψt − ϕ1t
)
µt − γ
1
2
σ
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)(
σψt − σϕ1t + 2(σϕ1t + β1t )
))
dt− λ(ψ↑T + ψ↓T − LT − UT )]
= E
[∫ T
0−
−
(
1
2
γ1σ2
(
ψt − ϕ1t
)2
+ γσ2Xt
(
ψt − ϕ1t
))
dt− λ(ψ↑T + ψ↓T − LT − UT )]
≤ −E
[∫ T
0−
1
2
γ1σ2θ2t dt
]
− E
[∫ T
0−
γσ2Xtθtdt+
∫ T
0−
g(Xt)dθt
]
. (8.12)
To simplify this expression, use Itoˆ’s formula, the dynamics (4.5) of the doubly-reflected Brownian
motion X, the growth properties of L and U , and the ODE for g from Lemma 8.1(ii) to compute
dg(Xt) =
1
2
δ2g′′(Xt)dt+ g′(Xt)
[
dLt − dUt
]
+ δg′(Xt)dWt
= γσ2Xtdt+ δg
′(Xt)dWt.
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Integration by parts in turn yields
d [g(Xt)θt] = g(Xt)dθt + γσ
2θtXtdt+ δθtg
′(Xt)dWt.
Since g′ is bounded, the integrability condition (4.2) implies that the local martingale part in this
decomposition is a true martingale, so that
E
[∫ T
0−
γσ2Xtθtdt+
∫ T
0−
g(Xt)dθt
]
= E [g(XT )θT ]− E [g(X0−)θ0−] = E [g(XT )θT ] . (8.13)
Now, the long-run optimality of ϕ1 for agent 1 follows from (8.12) and (8.13) by taking into account
that property (iv) of g and the transversality condition (4.3) imply
lim
T→∞
1
T
∣∣E [g(XT )θT ] ∣∣ ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
E [|g(XT )θT |] ≤ lim
T→∞
λ
T
E [|θT |] ≤ lim
T→∞
λ
T
E
[|ψT |+ |ϕ1T |] = 0.
An analogous argument shows that ϕ2 is optimal for agent 2, thereby completing the proof.
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
In this appendix, we establish existence, uniqueness, and properties for the second order nonlinear
ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3. To this end, we introduce the following first -order nonlinear ODE:
y′(x) = f(x, y(x)) := −ax2 + b+ F (y(x)), (A.1)
and extend the ideas of [27] to general functions F which satisfy Assumption A.1. That is, in
Lemma A.4, we establish that for suitable functions F , and any choice of a > 0 and b ≥ 0, (A.1)
has a unique positive solution on its maximal domain which contains [
√
b/a,∞). Then, for the
first-order ODE:
g′(x) = ax2 − b− F (g(x)), (A.2)
Lemma A.5 shows that there is a unique value of b that guarantees there is a solution on R such
that xg(x) ≤ 0, and the solution is unique. Moreover, Lemma A.6 proves that this solution to (A.2)
is also the unique solution of the second-order ODE:
g′′(x) = 2ax− F ′(g(x))g′(x). (A.3)
Finally, with the help of Lemma A.7 pointing out the relationship between Assumption 3.1 and
Assumption A.1, we establish the proof of Lemma 3.3 with F chosen to be proportional to the
Legendre transform of the trading cost function G.
To carry out this program, we first introduce the assumptions on F that are needed to generalize
the argument developed for power functions by [27]. Subsequently, in Remark A.2 and Lemma A.3,
we derive a number of consequences, which are crucial tools for the subsequent analysis.
Assumption A.1. (i) F is convex, differentiable, even, and strictly increasing on [0,∞) with
F (0) = 0;
(ii) F ′ is also differentiable and strictly increasing on [0,∞) with F ′(0) = 0;
(iii) There exists a constant K such that F (x) ≤ K(1 + |x|p) for some p ≥ 2;
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(iv) There exist constants C˜ > 0 and x0 > 0 such that F
′′(x) > C˜ for every |x| > x0.
Remark A.2. Some immediate consequences of Assumption A.1 are as follows:
(i) F ′ is increasing on the whole real line, since it is an odd function (as F is even) and F ′ is
strictly increasing on [0,∞);
(ii) Assumption (iv) implies that there is some aˆ > 0 such that F (x) > aˆx2 for large x > 0. This
is why p ≥ 2 in Assumption A.1(iii) is without loss of generality.
Lemma A.3. Suppose F satisfies Assumption A.1. Then:
(i) F−1 exists and is concave on [0,∞);
(ii) For every x ≥ 0 and every α ≥ 1:
αF (x) ≤ F (αx), F−1(αx) ≤ αF−1(x);
(iii) For x, y ≥ 0:
F (x+ y) ≥ F (x) + F (y), F−1(x) + F−1(y) ≥ F−1(x+ y);
(iv) On (0,∞), F−1 is strictly increasing but (F−1)′ is strictly decreasing;
(v) There exists constant C > 0 that F−1(x2) ≤ C|x| and 2x(F−1)′(x2) ≤ 2C for every |x| > x0.
Proof. (i): Convexity of F implies that, for x, y ≥ 0 and 0 < a < 1,
ax+ (1− a)y = aF (F−1(x)) + (1− a)F (F−1(y)) ≥ F (aF−1(x) + (1− a)F−1(y)).
As F is increasing, F−1 is increasing as well. Applying F−1 on both sides of the above estimate in
turn yields the concavity of F−1.
(ii): Recall that F (0) = 0 and again use convexity of F to obtain, for every x ≥ 0 and α ≥ 1,
F (αx) = α
[
1
α
F (αx) +
(
1− 1
α
)
F (0)
]
≥ αF
(
1
α
αx
)
= αF (x).
Analogously, the concavity of F−1 yields F−1(αx) ≤ αF−1(x).
(iii): Since F ′ is increasing we have F ′(x + y) − F ′(x) ≥ 0 for every x, y > 0. As a
consequence, F (x + y) − F (x) ≥ F (0 + y) − F (0) = F (y) as asserted. The same argument also
yields the analogous estimate for F−1.
(iv): Since F is convex and F and F ′ are strictly increasing on [0,∞), we have F ′(x) > 0
and F ′′(x) > 0 for every x > 0,
(F−1)′(x) =
1
F ′(F−1(x))
> 0, (F−1)′′(x) = − F
′′(F−1(x))(
F ′(F−1(x))
)3 < 0
so that F−1 is strictly increasing on [0,∞) but (F−1)′ is strictly decreasing on (0,∞) as asserted.
(v): By directly integrating the inequality in Assumption A.1 (iv) and choosing C large
enough, it’s easy to see that the first statement holds. For the second statement, by Assump-
tion A.1(ii),
d
dx
[
xF ′(x)− F (x)] = xF ′′(x) + F ′(x)− F ′(x) = xF ′′(x) > 0, for x > 0.
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Hence,
F ′(F−1(x2)) ≥ F (F
−1(x2))
F−1(x2)
=
x2
F−1(x2)
.
Together Assumption A.1(iv) it follows that, for x ≥ |x0|,
d
dx
F−1(x2) = 2x(F−1)′(x2) =
2x
F ′(F−1(x2))
≤ 2xF
−1(x2)
x2
≤ 2Cx
2
x2
= 2C,
which yields the desired result.
Now we address the existence and uniqueness of the positive solution to (A.1) on [
√
b/a,∞).
Lemma A.4. Let F be a function satisfying Assumption A.1 and a > 0, b ≥ 0. Then there exists
a unique solution y of
y′(x) = f(x, y(x)) := −ax2 + b+ F (y(x)), (A.1)
such that [0,∞) is contained in its maximal interval of existence, and y(x) ≥ 0 for every x ≥√b/a.
Moreover, y is increasing on [
√
b/a,∞) and satisfies the growth condition
lim
x→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
= 1. (A.4)
Further, in (A.1), if we consider y(x) = y(x; b), then on [0,∞),
∂y(x; b)
∂b
< 0. (A.5)
Proof. On [
√
b/a,+∞), define the function h(x) := F−1(ax2 − b). Notice that by definition of h(x)
we have f(x, h(x)) = 0 and h is strictly increasing on [
√
b/a,+∞). Thus we can infer that h is a
supersolution on (
√
b/a,∞) in that h′(x) ≥ f(x, h(x)).
Notice that f(x, y) is locally Lipschitz, so that local existence and uniqueness hold for the
initial-value problem (A.1). For every x¯ ∈ [√b/a,+∞), let y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) denote the unique solution
to (A.1) with initial condition (x¯, h(x¯)) on its maximal interval of existence. By directly calculating
the first-order derivative, we find that for every x¯ >
√
b/a,
y′(x¯; x¯, h(x¯)) = −ax¯2 + b+ F (y(x¯; x¯, h(x¯))) = −ax¯2 + b+ F (h(x¯)) = 0.
For the second-order derivative, we observe
y′′(x; x¯, h(x¯)) = −2ax+ F ′(y(x; x¯, h(x¯)))y′(x; x¯, h(x¯)),
which implies that y′′(x¯; x¯, h(x¯)) < 0 and y′(x; x¯, h(x¯)) < 0, where x ∈ (x¯, x¯ + ) for some  > 0.
In addition, for every x > x¯ such that y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) ≥ 0 still holds, we have F ′(y(x; x¯, h(x¯))) ≥ 0
and thus also y′′(x; x¯, h(x¯)) < 0, and y′(x; x¯, h(x¯)) < 0. This means that y will keep decreasing
until it is finally below 0, from which we can further infer that for x > x¯, y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) ≤ h(x). On
the other hand, for x ∈ [√b/a, x¯) in the maximal interval of existence, we can apply a symmetric
argument where we let x < x¯ go backwards. This shows y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) ≥ h(x) ≥ 0 and, since
y′(x; x¯, h(x¯)) = −ax2 + b+ F (y(x; x¯, h(x¯))) ≥ −ax2 + b+ F (h(x)) = 0,
y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) is increasing on [
√
b/a, x¯). Moreover, a comparison argument shows that for every
x¯ >
√
b/a, [
√
b/a, x¯] is contained in the maximal interval of existence of y(x; x¯, h(x¯)). And for
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x¯1 < x¯2, by the fact that the graph of the solutions cannot cross due to the local uniqueness,
and the fact that y(x; x¯1, h(x¯1)) is decreasing at x¯1 while y(x; x¯2, h(x¯2)) is increasing, the graph of
y(x; x¯1, h(x¯1)) lies below the graph of y(x; x¯2, h(x¯2)).
Next, we show that any solution y of (A.1) such that [
√
b/a,∞) is contained in its maximum
interval of existence, and y(x) ≥ 0 for every x ≥ √b/a, automatically satisfies the growth condi-
tion (A.4). From the above argument concerning the relationship between h(x) and y(x; x¯, h(x¯)),
an important observation is that for every x ∈ [√b/a,∞), we need to have y(x) > h(x), otherwise
the solution will not stay positive. We summarize the properties of y as follows:
i) y(x) > h(x) ≥ 0, and y′(x) = −ax2 + b + F (y(x)) > −ax2 + b + F (h(x)) = 0, which means y
is strictly increasing on [
√
b/a,+∞);
ii) [
√
b/a,+∞) ⊂ D, where D is the maximal interval of existence of y(x).
From property i) and Lemma A.3(iii,iv), it follows that
1 = lim
x→∞
F−1(ax2)− F−1(b)
F−1(ax2)
≤ lim inf
x→∞
h(x)
F−1(ax2)
≤ lim sup
x→∞
h(x)
F−1(ax2)
≤ lim
x→∞
F−1(ax2)
F−1(ax2)
= 1,
and in turn
lim inf
x→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
≥ 1.
Next we show that L := limx→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2) exists and L = 1. To this end, setM := lim supx→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
and notice that 1 ≤M ≤ ∞. If M = 1 then we can conclude L = 1.
Assume 1 < M < ∞. We first want to show M = L. Then there is a sequence (xn)n≥0 → ∞
such that limn→∞
y(xn)
F−1(ax2n)
= M . In particular, for any δ ∈ (0,M − 1) there exists Nδ ∈ N such
that for every n ≥ Nδ we have
y(xn) ≥ (M − δ)F−1(ax2n).
For large x, we claim that the function s(x) = (M − δ)F−1(ax2) is a subsolution of (A.1). By
Lemma A.3(v), we know that for x ≥ |x0|/
√
a,
0 < s′(x) = (M − δ)(F−1)′(ax2)2ax ≤ 2√a(M − δ)C.
Since M − δ > 1, there exists x¯ such that for x ≥ x¯, we have (M − δ)ax2−ax2 + b ≥ 2√a(M − δ)C.
As a consequence,
s′(x) ≤ 2√a(M − δ)C ≤ −ax2 + b+ (M − δ)ax2
= −ax2 + b+ F (F−1((M − δ)ax2))
≤ −ax2 + b+ F ((M − δ)F−1(ax2)) = f(x, s(x)).
Thus, for every δ ∈ (0,M − 1) and some x¯, we have y(x) ≥ s(x) = (M − δ)F−1(ax2) for x ≥ x¯. In
particular, for every small δ,
lim inf
x→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
≥M − δ,
and therefore
lim inf
x→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
= M = lim sup
x→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2)
.
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If M = ∞, we substitute M − δ with N ∈ N and then infer with the same argument that
lim infx→∞
y(x)
F−1(ax2) =∞. In other words, the limit L exists and L = M ∈ (1,∞].
Next, we show L = 1. First, assume to the contrary 1 < L < ∞. Since limx→∞ y(x)F−1(ax2) = L,
and by Assumption A.1(iv), there exists a constant K > 0 such that y(x) ≤ Kx for large x > 0.
Moreover, for every δ ∈ (0, L− 1) and large x, by Property A.3(ii),
y(x) ≥ (L− δ)F−1(ax2) ≥ F−1((L− δ)ax2).
As a consequence,
lim inf
x→∞
F (y(x))
ax2
≥ L− δ.
On the other hand, (A.1) implies
lim inf
x→∞
y′(x)
ax2
= L− δ − 1 > 0,
so that y′(x) grows at least quadratically, leading to a contradiction.
Now assume that L = +∞. From (A.1) it follows that
lim
x→∞
y′(x)
F (y(x))
= 1.
Notice that for large x such that y(x) > Cx0, Assumption A.1(iv) yields
y(x)2
C2
= F
(
F−1
(
y(x)2
C2
))
≤ F
(
C
y(x)
C
)
= F (y(x)).
Thus, for small δ and sufficiently large x, we have 1−δ
C2
y2(x) ≤ (1− δ)F (y(x)) ≤ y′(x). This implies
that, for large x > x¯,
y(x) ≥ 1
1
y(x¯) − 1−δC2 (x− x¯)
.
In particular, y(x) has a vertical asymptote, contradicting Property ii). In summary, we therefore
have L = 1.
We now show the uniqueness of y(x). Suppose there exists another solution y2 of (A.1) such
that [
√
b/a,∞) is contained in its maximal domain, and y2(x) ≥ 0 for every x ≥
√
b/a, and there
exists x¯, δ > 0 such that y2(x¯) ≥ y(x¯) + δ. Then, on [x¯,∞), the graph of y2 always lies above y
otherwise it will violate the local uniqueness of (A.1). Moreover, for x ≥ x¯,
y′2(x)− y′(x) = F (y2(x))− F (y(x)) ≥ 0,
which means y2 − y is increasing. As a result,
y′2(x)− y′(x) = F (y2(x))− F (y(x)) ≥ F (y2(x)− y(x)) ≥ F (y2(x¯)− y(x¯)) ≥ F (δ) > 0,
which implies that, for every x > x¯,
y2(x)− y(x) ≥ δ + (x− x¯)F (δ).
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But then, since y2 also satisfies (A.4), and for large x we have F
−1(ax2) ≤ √aCx,
0 = lim
x→∞
y2(x)− y(x)
F−1(ax2)
≥ lim
x→∞
δ + (x− x¯)F (δ)√
aCx
=
F (δ)√
aC
> 0,
leads to contradiction. A symmetric argument yields the same results for the case where there
exists x¯ and δ > 0 such that y2(x¯) ≤ y(x¯)− δ. This establishes uniqueness.
We now establish existence of a solution with the asserted properties. To this end, define
y∗(x) := sup{y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) : x¯ ∈ [
√
b/a,+∞)} for every x in the union of the maximal existence of
interval of y(x; x¯, h(x¯)).
By Lemma A.3(v), for every x1 ≥ 0, we can choose a large y1 > F−1(ax21 + 2
√
aC + x0) such
that the function y˜(x) = F−1(F (y1) +a(x2−x21)) is a subsolution to (A.1): choose y1 large enough
such that
y˜′(x) = 2ax(F−1)′(F (y1) + a(x2 − x21)) ≤ 2
√
aC ≤ F (y1)− ax21 + b = f(x, y˜(x)).
Moreover, again by the fact the subsolution and the supersolution cannot cross, the graph of y˜ does
not intersect the graph of h on [
√
b/a,∞). In particular, the unique local solution y(x;x1, y1) to
(A.1) with initial condition (x1, y1) satisfies
y˜′(x1) ≤ f(x1, y˜(x1)) = f(x1, y1) = y′(x1;x1, y1).
A comparison argument shows that [
√
b/a,∞) is contained in the maximal interval of existence of
y(x;x1, y1), hence is strictly larger than h(x) for every x ≥
√
b/a. Thus for every x¯ ≥ √b/a, the
graph of y(x;x1, y1) lies above y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) and, in particular, y1 = y(x1;x1, y1) > y(x1; x¯, h(x¯)).
Taking the supremum over x¯ yields that y∗(x1) ≤ y1 < +∞.
Moreover, for every x ≥√b/a and every  > 0,
y∗(x+ )− y∗(x) = sup{y(x+ ; x¯, h(x¯))− y∗(x) : x¯ ∈ [
√
b/a,+∞)}
≤ sup{y(x+ ; x¯, h(x¯))− y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) : x¯ ∈ [
√
b/a,+∞)}
≤
∫ x+
x
sup{y′(ξ; x¯, h(x¯)) : x¯ ∈ [
√
b/a,+∞)}dξ
=
∫ x+
x
−aξ2 + b+ sup{F (y(ξ; x¯, h(x¯))) : x¯ ∈ [
√
b/a,+∞)}dξ
=
∫ x+
x
−aξ2 + b+ F (y∗(ξ))dξ
=
∫ x+
x
f(ξ, y∗(ξ))dξ.
As a consequence,
lim sup
→0
y∗(x+ )− y∗(x)

≤ f(x, y∗(x)).
On the other hand, notice that for arbitrary x¯ > x >
√
b/a, y(x; x¯, h(x¯)) is increasing in x¯, thus
for every , δ > 0 there exists x¯ > x+ such that y(x; x¯, h(x¯))+δ > y∗(x). In this case, y(ξ; x¯, h(x¯))
is still increasing in the interval [x, x+ ], and for every ξ ∈ [x, x+ ],
F (y(ξ; x¯, h(x¯))) ≥ F (y(x; x¯, h(x¯))) ≥ F (y∗(x)− δ).
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Therefore,
y∗(x+ )− y∗(x) ≥ −δ + y∗(x+ )− y(x; x¯, h(x¯))
≥ y(x+ ; x¯, h(x¯))− y(x; x¯, h(x¯))− δ
=
∫ x+
x
y′(ξ; x¯, h(x¯))dξ − δ
=
∫ x+
x
−aξ2 + b+ F (y(ξ; x¯, h(x¯)))dξ − δ
≥ F (y∗(x)− δ)− δ +
∫ x+
x
(−aξ2 + b)dξ.
As this holds for arbitrary small δ > 0, it follows that
y∗(x+ )− y∗(x) ≥ F (y∗(x)) +
∫ x+
x
(−aξ2 + b)dξ,
and in turn
lim inf
→0
y∗(x+ )− y∗(x)

≥ −ax2 + b+ F (y∗(x)) = f(x, y∗(x)).
In summary, y∗ therefore is a solution to (A.1) and satisfies properties i), ii) and hence satisfies also
the growth condition (A.4).
Finally, for b2 > b1 ≥ 0, we show the relationship between y1 and y2. Define as before h1(x) =
F−1(ax2− b1) and h2(x) = F−1(ax2− b2). Observe that h1(x¯) > h2(x¯) for x¯ >
√
b2/a and because
note that any solution of (A.1) with coefficient b1 is a subsolution of (A.1) with coefficient b2.
Whence, a comparison argument shows that the unique local solution y1(x; x¯, h1(x¯)) of the first
equation with initial condition (x¯, h1(x¯)) lies above the unique local solution y2(x; x¯, h2(x¯)) of the
second equation with terminal condition (x¯, h2(x¯)). Another comparison argument guarantees that
y1(x; x¯, h1(x¯)) and y2(x; x¯, h2(x¯)) cannot cross. Therefore, it follows that [
√
b1/a,∞) is contained
in both of the maximal interval of existence of y1 and y2 with y1(x) ≥ y2(x).
Now, we show that y1 > y2 on [
√
b1/a,∞). Suppose to the contrary that there exits x0 ≥
√
b1/a
such that y1(x0) = y2(x0). Then,
y′1(x0) = −ax20 + b1 + F (y1(x0)) = −ax20 + b1 + F (y2(x0)) < −ax20 + b2 + F (y2(x0)) = y′2(x0),
which means that there exists  > 0 such that for x ∈ (x0, x0 + ), y2(x) > y1(x). This contradicts
that y1(x) ≥ y2(x) on [
√
b1/a,∞). Hence we conclude y1(x) > y2(x). By a standard argument [15,
Proposition 2.76, Theorem 2.77], y(x; b) is differentiable with respect to b, and for every b > 0,
[0,
√
b/a] is also contained in the maximal interval of existence of y(x; b). Hence we can infer (A.5)
holds, and [0,∞) is contained in the maximal interval of existence of y for every b ≥ 0.
In A.4, we have shown that every b ≥ 0, there exists non-negative solution yr to (A.1) on [0,∞).
A symmetric argument yields that for every b ≥ 0, there exists a non-positive solution yl to (A.1)
on (−∞, 0]. Then by the monotonicity of y(0; b) with respect to b, there exists a unique choice of
the constant b in (A.1) that allows to smoothly paste together the solution yl and yr at 0, thereby
obtaining a solution of (A.1) on the whole real line which satisfies xg(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ R.
Lemma A.5. Let F be a function satisfying Assumption A.1. Then there exists a unique constant
bF such that the ODE
g′(x) = ax2 − b− F (g(x)), (A.2)
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has a solution g on R such that xg(x) ≤ 0. Moreover, g is unique, and it is odd and decreasing and
satisfies the following growth conditions:
lim
x→−∞
g(x)
F−1(ax2)
= 1, lim
x→+∞
g(x)
F−1(ax2)
= −1. (A.6)
Further, there exists K > 0, such that
|g(x)| ≤ K(1 + |x|), |g′(x)| ≤ K.
Proof. From Lemma A.4, we know that for every parameter b ≥ 0 there exists a unique solution
yr(x; b) on its maximal domain Db of existence and yr(x; b) ≥ 0 for every x ≥
√
b/a, and yr(x; b) is
unique and satisfies
lim
x→+∞
yr(x; b)
F−1(ax2)
= 1.
By Lemma A.4, we have [0,∞) ⊂ Db. Define yl(x; b) = −yr(−x; b) on (−∞, 0], then
lim
x→−∞
yl(x; b)
F−1(ax2)
= − lim
x→−∞
yr(−x; b)
F−1(ax2)
= − lim
x→∞
yr(x; b)
F−1(ax2)
= −1.
Moreover, since F is even, for x ≤ 0,
yl
′(x; b) = yr ′(−x; b) = −a(−x)2 + b+ F (yr(−x; b)) = −ax2 + b+ F (−yr(−x; b))
= −ax2 + b+ F (yl(x; b)). (A.7)
That is, yl(x; b) also satisfies (A.1) on (−∞, 0].
For b = 0, by i) in the proof of Lemma A.4, yr(x; 0) > F
−1(ax2), hence
yr(0; 0) > F
−1(0) = 0 > −yr(0; 0) = yl(0; 0).
By (A.5) in Lemma A.4, for x ≥ 0, yr(x; b) is strictly decreasing in b and yr(x; b) ≤ yr(x; 0) < ∞.
In addition, we claim that as b → +∞, yr(0; b) goes to −∞. Suppose not, then there exists
δ1 := limb→+∞ yr(0; b) > −∞. As a result,
yr(1; b) = yr(0; b) +
∫ 1
0
−ax2 + b+ F (y(x; b)) dx ≥ yr(0; b) +
∫ 1
0
(−a+ b)dx ≥ δ1 + b− a,
and, for b→ +∞,
yr(1; 0) ≥ lim sup
b→+∞
yr(1; b) ≥ lim inf
b→+∞
yr(1; b) ≥ lim
b→+∞
δ1 + b− a = +∞,
which leads to contradiction. Hence as b→ +∞, yr(0; b) goes to −∞, and yl(0; b) = −yr(0; b) goes
to +∞. Thus, for some constant bF we have 0 is contained in DbF and
yr(0; bF ) = 0 = yl(0; bF ). (A.8)
As yr(x; b) is decreasing in b, the constant bF is unique.
Now we use yr(·; bF ) and yl(·; bF ) to construct the solution for (A.2):
g(x) := −yr(x; bF )1[x≥0] − yl(x; bF )1[x<0].
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It’s easy to see that g is defined on R and satisfies the growth conditions (A.6). We now show that
g is indeed a solution of (A.2). Using (A.8), we can see that g is continuous at x = 0. Therefore,
g(x) = −yr(x; bF )1[x≥0] + yr(−x; bF )1[x<0] = −yr(x; bF )1[x>0] + yr(−x; bF )1[x≤0] = −g(−x),
which implies that g is odd. Furthermore, as yr is increasing on [
√
bF /a,∞), and for x ∈ [0,
√
bF /a],
y′r(x; bF ) = −ax2 + bF + F (yr(x; bF )) ≥ −ax2 + bF ≥ 0,
hence yr is increasing on [0,∞), and we infer that g is decreasing. Since F is even, we have
F (g(x)) = F (−yr(x; bF )) = F (−yl(−x; bF )) = F (g(−x)), for x ≥ 0.
Therefore we can conclude that
g′(x) = −yr ′(x) = ax2 − bF − F (yr(x; bF )) = ax2 − bF − F (g(x)), for x > 0.
Likewise,
g′(x) = −yl′(x) = ax2 − bF − F (yl(x; bF )) = ax2 − bF − F (g(x)), for x < 0.
Moreover, the continuity of g′ is guaranteed at x = 0 since
lim
x→0+
g′(x; bF ) = −yr ′(0; bF ) = −bF = −yl′(0; bF ) = lim
x→0−
g′(x; bF ).
In summary, g therefore is indeed a solution of (A.2) with b = bF .
Next, we show that g is unique. With b = bF , we know from Lemma A.4 that there is a unique
solution yr(x; bF ) of (A.1) with maximal domain DbF containing [0,∞). Moreover, notice that
yl(x; bF ) also satisfies (A.1) with b = bF , which implies that DbF = R. Hence for every x < 0, we
have yl(x; bF ) = yr(x; bF ) and in turn g(x) = −yr(x; bF ) for x ∈ R. The uniqueness of g follows
from the uniqueness of yr(·; bF ) for the unique choice of bF .
The growth condition (A.6) implies that there exist x0 > 0 and cˆ > 0 such that, for every
|x| > x0,
|g(x)| = |yr(|x|)| ≤ 2|F−1(ax2)| ≤ 2cˆ|x|.
Therefore, for all x, and since −g is increasing,
|g(x)| ≤ sup
[−x0,x0]
|g(x)|+ 2c|x| ≤ |g(x0)|+ 2cˆ|x|. (A.9)
Now we would like to show the boundedness of g′, which follows the same idea as [8]. Since g
is odd, we only need to show that for x > 0, g′ is bounded from below. From (A.9), we can infer
that as x → ∞, g′ cannot go to −∞. Therefore, there exists M > 0 and an increasing sequence
{xn}∞n=1 such that xn → ∞ and −M ≤ g′(xn) ≤ 0. Now suppose g′ is not bounded from below,
which means that for every integer n > M , there exists zn > xn such that g
′(zn) ≤ −n. For each
n > M , let m(n) > n denote the first integer such that xn < zn < xm(n). Then from
g′(zn) ≤ −n < −M ≤ min{g′(xn), g′(xm(n))},
we can infer that there exists a local minimum of g′ on [xn, xm(n)] for every integer n > M , denoted
by ξn. Therefore, for every integer n > M , g
′′(ξn) = 0, and
0 ≤ g′′′(ξn) = 2a− F ′′(g(ξn))
(
g′(ξn)
)2 − F ′(g(ξn))g′′(ξn) = 2a− F ′′(g(ξn))(g′(ξn))2.
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Together with Assumption A.1 (ii, iv), we know that F ′′(g(ξn)) > 0, and hence for n large enough
n2 ≤ (g′(ξn))2 ≤ 2a
F ′′(g(ξn))
≤ 2a
C˜
,
which leads to a contradiction. Without loss of generality, we choose M > 0 large enough so that
|g′(x)| < M for every |x| > x0.
Now choose K > M + |g(x0)|+ 2cˆ, we have
|g(x)| ≤ K(1 + |x|), |g′(x)| ≤ K
as asserted. This completes the proof.
Next, we show that with b = bF , the solution to the first-order ODE (A.2) on R with xg(x) ≤ 0
is also the unique solution on R to the second-order ODE (A.3) with xg(x) ≤ 0.
Lemma A.6. Let F be a function satisfying Assumption (A.1). Then the unique solution g on R
to (A.2) such that xg(x) ≤ 0 is also the unique solution on R of the second-order ODE
g′′(x) = 2ax− F ′(g(x))g′(x) (A.3)
such that xg(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. In view of the first-order ODE (A.2) satisfied by g, its derivative is also differentiable.
Differentiating the ODE for g in turn shows that g also satisfies the second-order ODE (A.3).
Now suppose g˜ is a solution of the second-order ODE (A.3) with xg(x) ≤ 0. As
[F (g˜((x)))]′ = F ′(g˜(x))g˜′(x),
integrating both sides of (A.3) gives
g˜′(x) = g˜′(0) +
∫ x
0
(
2aξ − F ′(g˜(ξ))g˜′(ξ)
)
dξ = ax2 − b˜− F (g˜(x)),
for some constant b˜. By Lemma A.5 we know that bF is the unique constant such that (A.2) has
a solution on R with xg(x) ≤ 0. Thus, b˜ = bF and, by the uniqueness of g, we have g˜ = g. This
completes the proof.
We introduce one more Lemma before the proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma A.7. Suppose the general cost function G satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then G∗, the Legendre
transform of G, satisfies Assumption A.1, and so does cG∗, where c > 0 is a constant.
Proof. Observe that the Legendre transformation of the cost function G(x) is
G∗(x) = x(G′)−1(x)−G((G′)−1(x)).
Since the instantaneous cost G is even, G′ and in turn (G′)−1 are odd, so that the function G∗ is
even. Moreover, G(0) = G′(0) = 0 imply G∗(0) = 0. As both G and (G′)−1 are differentiable,
(G∗)′(x) = (G′)−1(x) > 0.
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In particular, (G∗)−1 exists on [0,∞) and is differentiable. Moreover, by the convexity and twice
differentiability of G,
(G∗)′′(x) = ((G′)−1)′(x) > 0.
It follows that G∗ is convex and (G∗)′ is strictly increasing, so that Assumptions A.1 (i,ii) are
satisfied. By Assumption 3.1, |(G′)−1(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|k−1) for C > 0 and k ≥ 2. Whence, there
exists a constant K > 0 such that
G∗(x) = |G∗(x)| ≤ |x(G′)−1(x)| ≤ C(|x|+ |x|k) ≤ K(1 + |x|k).
Therefore, Assumption A.1(iii) is also satisfied. Again by Assumption 3.1, there exists C > 0 and
x0 > 0, such that for large x > x0, ((G
′)−1)′(x) ≥ 1C , and hence
(G∗)′′(x) = ((G′)−1)(x) ≥ 1
C
.
Thus, Assumption A.1(iv) holds as well.
We now turn to the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let G∗ denote the Legendre transform of G, and define
a =
γσ2
δ2
, F (x) =
2
δ2
G∗(x),
where γ and δ are defined as in Lemma 3.3. By Lemma A.7, G∗ and in turn F satisfy Assump-
tion A.1. For the above choices of a and F , Lemma A.4 and Lemma A.5 therefore yield the existence
and uniqueness of the constant bF and the solution g on R to the first-order ODE (A.2) such that
xg(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ R. In view of the first-order ODE (A.2) satisfied by g,
g′(x) =
γσ2
δ2
x2 − F (g(x))− bF = γσ
2
δ2
x2 − 2
δ2
[
g(x)(G′)−1(g(x))−G((G′)−1(g(x)))]− bF ,
Lemma A.6 shows that g is also the unique solution to the ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3:
1
2
δ2g′′(x) = −[g(x)(G′)−1(g(x))−G((G′)−1(g(x)))]′ + γσ2x = −g′(G′)−1(g(x)) + γσ2x.
Here, we have used in the last step that(
g(x)(G′)−1(g(x))−G((G′)−1(g(x)))′
=g′(x)(G′)−1(g(x)) + g(x)((G′)−1)′(g(x))g′(x)−G′((G′)−1(g(x))((G′)−1)′(g(x))g′(x)
=g′(x)(G′)−1(g(x)) + g(x)((G′)−1)′(g(x))g′(x)− g(x)((G′)−1)′(g(x))g′(x)
=g′(x)(G′)−1(g(x)).
To complete the proof, notice that
F−1(ax2) = F−1
(
γσ2
δ2
x2
)
= (G∗)−1
(
δ2
2
γσ2
δ2
x2
)
= (G∗)−1
(
γσ2
2
x2
)
,
which yields the analogue of the growth conditions A.6:
lim
x→−∞
g(x)
(G∗)−1(γσ
2
2 x
2)
= 1, lim
x→+∞
g(x)
(G∗)−1(γσ
2
2 x
2)
= −1. (A.10)
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B Calibration Details
In this section, we provide some additional details concerning the calibration of the model with
costs of general power form at the end of Section 5.2. If Gq(x) = λq|x|q/q, q ∈ (1, 2], then the
nonlinear ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3 can be simplified by rescaling. Indeed, the solution then can
be written as
gq(x) =
(
λq
q
) 3
q+2
(
γσ2δ4q
8
) q−1
q+2
g˜q
(
2
q−1
q+2
(
qγσ2
λq
) 1
q+2
(
1
δq
) 2q
q+2
x
)
, (B.1)
where g˜q is the unique solution on R of9
g˜′′q (x) + g˜
′
q(x)sign(g˜q(x))
∣∣∣∣ g˜q(x)q
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 = 2x. (B.2)
Since this rescaled ODE depends only the elasticity q of the price impact function but not the other
model parameters, it only needs to be solved numerically once for each q to match the corresponding
parameters λq and δq the transaction cists and trading volume observed empirically. To wit, the
stationary density of the state variable X from Lemma 3.4 is10
νq(x) = cq exp
(
− 2
δ2q
∫ x
0
∣∣∣∣gq(y)λq
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 dy
)
, where cq =
[
2
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− 2
δ2q
∫ x
0
∣∣∣∣gq(y)λq
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 dy
)
dx
]−1
.
We also let vq denote the variance for νq.
The goal now is to choose the model parameters λq and δq to match the share turnover in the
model to its empirical level and the stationary variance of the state variable to its counterpart for
proportional costs. To this end, define
c˜q =
[
2
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ x
0
∣∣∣∣ g˜q(y)q
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 dy
)
dx
]−1
, v˜q = 2c˜q
∫ ∞
0
x2 exp
(
−
∫ x
0
∣∣∣∣ g˜q(y)q
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 dy
)
dx
and note that we have
cq = 2
q−1
q+2
(
qγσ2
λq
) 1
q+2
(
1
δq
) 2q
q+2
c˜q. (B.3)
To match the total share turnover, we therefore need
ShTu =
∫ ∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣gq(x)λq
∣∣∣∣ 1q−1 νq(x)dx = cqδ2q = 2 q−1q+2 (qγσ2λq
) 1
q+2
(
1
δq
) 2q
q+2
c˜qδ
2
q (B.4)
With the same trick here, we can calculate the variance of the stationary law
2cq
∫ ∞
0
x2νq(x)dx =
v˜q
4
q−1
q+2
(
qγσ2
λq
) 2
q+2
(
1
δq
) 4q
q+2
.
9As shown in Lemma A.6, g˜q is in fact the solution to the first-order equation (17) in [27, Theorem 6], with
q = α+ 1.
10Notice that for quadratic costs q = 2, this is the standard normal distribution.
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As a result, we can thus match the standard deviation of the stationary law νq with the corre-
sponding value l/
√
3 for proportional transaction costs,
l√
3
=
√
v˜q
2
q−1
q+2
(
qγσ2
λq
) 1
q+2
(
1
δq
) 2q
q+2
. (B.5)
Conditions (B.4) and (B.5) in turn lead to
δq =
(
(ShTu)2l2
3c˜2q v˜q
) 1
4
as well as λq =
(
2c˜q
ShTu
)q qγσ2l2
6v˜q
. (B.6)
In summary, for a given value of q, the solution g˜q of (B.2) therefore needs to be computed nu-
merically on a fine grid once. Then, we can use numerical integration to approximate c˜q, v˜q and in
turn compute δq, λq via (B.6).
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